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Systemic Risk of Insurers Around the Globe
26th January 2015
ABSTRACT
We study the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life insurers to systemic
risk between 2000 and 2012. For our full sample period, we find systemic risk in the international
insurance sector to be small. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to the fragility of the financial
system peaked during the recent financial crisis. In our panel regressions, we find the interconnect-
edness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure
to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily
driven by the insurers’ leverage.
Keywords: Systemic risk, insurer size, interconnectedness, insurance.
JEL Classification: G01, G22.
“SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size,
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider
financial system and economic activity.”
Financial Stability Board, 11/04/2011
1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group (AIG) became
the first example of an insurance company that required (and received) a bailout due to it being
regarded as systemically important. Not only did AIG’s near-collapse come to the surprise of most
economists who considered systemic risk to be confined to the banking sector, but it also spurred
a realignment of insurance regulation towards a macroprudential supervision of so-called global
systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). As a consequence, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
together with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) recently published a
list of nine G-SIIs which will ultimately face higher capital and loss absorbency requirements. In
their methodology, insurers are deemed to be of systemic relevance to the global financial sector, if
they are of such size and global interconnectedness that their default would cause severe disruptions
in the financial sector and subsequently the real economy.
However, the (heavily criticized)1 methodology proposed by the IAIS has only undergone lim-
ited empirical scrutiny so far. Most importantly, the relation between the interconnectedness and
systemic risk of insurers has not been analyzed before. In this paper, we intend to fill this gap in
the literature by investigating whether the interconnectedness of insurers with the global financial
sector in addition to their size increased the insurers’ individual contribution to systemic risk. As
the main result of our analysis of a panel of global insurers from 2000 to 2012, we find that in-
terconnectedness only increases the systemic vulnerability of large life and non-life insurers. In
contrast, the impact of an insurer’s interconnectedness on its contribution to systemic risk is much
less clear.
1 For example, the Secretary General of the Geneva Association, John Fitzpatrick, criticized the IAIS indicators
for penalizing risk diversification.
Economists have long neglected the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize the whole
financial system. In contrast to banks, insurers are not subject to depositor runs and thus do not
face the risk of a sudden liquidity drain,2 hold more capital (see Harrington, 2009) and are less
interconnected horizontally with the rest of the financial sector. However, the case of American
International Group (AIG) showed that insurers can become systemically important nonetheless
if they engage too heavily in business activities outside the traditional insurance sector. As a
consequence, the Financial Stability Board urged the IAIS to identify G-SIIs that could potentially
destabilize the global financial sector and to implement new regulation for these insurers. Building
on the experiences made during the AIG case, the IAIS (2012) recently published a proposal for
a methodology for identifying G-SIIs that cites non-core and non-insurance activities, insurer size
and interconnectedness as the major drivers of systemic risk in the insurance industry.
Both the question whether insurers can actually become systemically important and the ques-
tion whether the IAIS’s proposed methodology is suitable for identifying G-SIIs remain relatively
unanswered in the literature. Early treatments of the topic of systemic risk in insurance include the
works by Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009) and Cummins and Weiss (2014).3 In the latter,
it is hypothesized that non-core activities and high degrees of interconnectedness are the primary
causes of insurers’ systemic relevance. The interconnectedness of insurers is also empirically ana-
lyzed by Billio et al. (2012) who argue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic risks in
times of financial crisis. In a related study, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that systemic risks exist in
the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in banking. More importantly, systemic risk
in insurance appears to have grown partly as a consequence to the increasing interconnectedness
of insurers and their activities outside the traditional insurance business. Chen et al. (2014) put a
special emphasis on the insurance sector but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intra-
day stock price data that the insurance sector is exposed but does not contribute to systemic risks in
2 Although one could possibly think of an “insurer run” on life insurance policies, this possibility appears to
be highly unlikely as insurance customers are often protected by guarantees and as cancelling a long-term life
insurance policy often implies the realization of severe losses. Consequently, there exists no example of a default
of an insurer in the past that caused significant contagion eﬀects (see, e.g., Eling and Pankoke, 2012).
3 Other analyses of systemic risk in insurance include the works of Eling and Schmeiser (2010);
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
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the banking sector. While the former two studies are only concerned with the interconnectedness
of banks and insurers, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014b) also study the impact of size, leverage and
other idiosyncratic characteristics included in the IAIS methodology on the systemic risk exposure
and contribution of U.S. insurers during the financial crisis.4 Most importantly, they find that in-
surer size seems to have been a major driver of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S.
insurers. Several of the IAIS indicators (like, e.g., geographical diversification), however, do not
appear to be significantly related to the systemic risk of insurers. Finally, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel
(2014a) support the too-big-to-fail conjecture for insurers by showing that insurer mergers tend to
increase the systemic risk of the acquiring insurers.
We complement the existing empirical literature on systemic risk in insurance by performing
the first panel regression analysis of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of international
insurers. In particular, we test hypotheses that size and interconnectedness could drive the sys-
temic importance of international insurers. To measure an insurer’s exposure and contribution to
the fragility of the financial sector, we follow Anginer et al. (2014b,a) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel
(2014a,b) and employ the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010) and
∆CoVaR methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), respectively. We then estimate these
measures for a sample of 253 international life and non-life insurers for the period from 2000 to
2012 and perform panel regressions of the quarterly MES and ∆CoVaR estimates. As independent
variables, we use insurer-specific and macroeconomic variables that have been discussed in the
literature as potential drivers of systemic risk. Most importantly, we employ the measure of inter-
connectedness proposed by Billio et al. (2012) which is based on a principal component analysis
of the stock returns of financial institutions.5
Based on a sample of 253 life and non-life insurers, we find systemic risk in the international
insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the literature for banks. However,
confirming the results of Baluch et al. (2011), we find a strong upward trend in both the exposure
4 In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2013) analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are systemically
important based on the insurers’ SRISK (see Acharya et al., 2012).
5 Other potential measures of the interconnectedness of financial institutions include the measures proposed by
Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) which are both based on Granger causality tests.
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and contribution of insurers to the fragility of the global financial system during the financial crisis.
In our panel regressions, we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the financial sector
to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of
insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ size and leverage.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the
methodology used in our empirical study. Section 3 presents the results of our investigation into the
determinants of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Concluding remarks are given in Section
4.
2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our main
independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
2.1 Sample construction
We construct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international insurers from
the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. For reasons of relevance,
we concentrate on insurance firms with total assets in excess of $ 1 billion at the end of 2000. We
then omit all firms for which stock price data are unavailable in Datastream. Next, we exclude all
secondary listings and nonprimary issues from our sample. Further, we exclude Berkshire Hath-
away which is listed as an insurance company in Datastream due to its unusually high stock price.
Balance-sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope database and
all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to minimize a possible bias in
our results stemming from currency risk.
Finally, we split our data sample into life and non-life insurers. The definition of life and non-
life insurance companies in the company lists of Datastream is somewhat fuzzy.6 Therefore, the
6 For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insurance compa-
nies in Datastream’s company lists.
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industry classification of Datastream is cross-checked with the firms’ SIC code (Worldscope data
item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331) and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
code (Worldscope data item WC07040, ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms which cannot be
clearly classified as life or non-life insurance companies.7 Additionally, all company names are
manually screened for words suggesting a non-insurance nature of the companies’ business and
the respective companies being excluded from the sample. In total, we end up with an interna-
tional sample of 253 insurers, containing 112 life insurers and 141 non-life insurers. For increased
transparency, the names of all insurers in our sample are listed in Appendix A.1.
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the diﬀerent dependent and independent
variables we use in our empirical study. An overview of all variables and data sources is given in
Appendix A.2.
2.2 Systemic risk measures
Our analysis focuses on the exposure and contribution of individual insurers to the systemic risk
of the global financial sector during the period 2000 through 2012. Consequently, we employ an
insurer’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), Systemic Risk Index/Capital Shortfall (SRISK) and
∆CoVaR as main dependent variables in our regression analyses. We estimate the three measures of
systemic risk for each quarter in our sample using daily stock market data for our sample insurers.
Our choice of these systemic risk measures is motivated by the fact that these measures have
been extensively discussed in the literature and are also used by regulators and central banks for
monitoring financial stability (see Benoit et al., 2013).8 As our first measure of systemic risk,
we use the quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall which is a static structural form approach to
measure an individual insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. It is defined by Acharya et al. (2010) as
7 Consequently, HMO, managed care and title insurance companies are not included in the final sample.
8 All three systemic risk measures we employ share the property that they are all based on economic theory and
capture diﬀerent aspects of systemic risk. Since the recent financial crisis, several other measures of systemic risk
have been proposed in the literature. Further examples for such measures apart from those used in this study are
due to De Jonghe (2010); Huang et al. (2012); Schwaab et al. (2011); Hautsch et al. (2014); Hovakimian et al.
(2012) and White et al. (2012).
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the negative average return on an individual insurers stock on the days a market index experienced
its 5% worst outcomes. As a proxy for the market’s return, we use the World Datastream Bank
Index in our main analysis.
Next, we implement the∆CoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), which
is based on the tail covariation between the returns of individual financial institutions and the finan-
cial system. We use ∆CoVaR as an additional measure of an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk
as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) criticize the MES measure for not being able to adequately
address the procyclicality that arises from contemporaneous risk measurement.9 While the uncon-
ditional ∆CoVaR estimates are constant over time, the conditional ∆CoVaR is time-varying and
estimated using a set of state variables that capture the evolution of tail risk dependence over time.
However, since we calculate ∆CoVaR based on stock prices for a given quarter, the standard state
variables used for estimating the conditional CoVaR show almost no time-variation. Consequently,
we focus on estimating the unconditional version of ∆CoVaR in our analysis. An insurer’s con-
tribution to systemic risk is then measured as the diﬀerence between CoVaR conditional on the
insurer being under distress and the CoVaR in the median state of the institution. A lower value
of ∆CoVaR indicates a higher contribution to systemic risk, while a positive MES indicates an
exposure to systemic risk rather than a stabilizing eﬀect.
As our third systemic risk measure, we use SRISK which attempts to measure the expected
capital shortfall of a firm. SRISK is given as the average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk
Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). An insurer’s SRISK
is estimated by the insurer’s book value of debt weighted with a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%)
plus the weighted long run Marginal Expected Shortfall multiplied by the insurer’s market value
of equity.
9 Conversely, Acharya et al. (2010) criticize the ∆CoVaR measure as being based on a non-coherent risk measure.
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2.3 Explanatory variables
In this subsection, we characterize the main independent variables we use in our panel regres-
sions and robustness checks later on. In our analysis we attempt to capture the key features that
make insurers become systemically relevant. We thus concentrate on the factors that have recently
been suggested by the IAIS (2011, 2012) as potential sources of systemic risk in insurance. We
therefore include in our regressions proxies for an insurer’s size, its capital structure, non-core
activities, and interconnectedness with the financial system.
To proxy for the latter, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a financial institu-
tion proposed by Billio et al. (2012). Let Zi be the standardized stock returns of the ith institutions
and G = Cov(Zi, Z j)i j be the covariance matrix of the institutions’s daily stock returns. Using
principal component analysis, we are able to decompose this matrix into a matrix Λ, which is a
diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λN of G, and a matrix L = (Lik)ik that contains the eigen-
vectors of the returns’ correlation matrix. Billio et al. (2012) then define the system’s variance
as
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
σiσ jLikL jkλk
In their work, Billio et al. (2012) argue that the more interconnected a system is, the less eigen-
values are necessary to explain a proportion of H of the system’s variance σ2S .10 A univariate
measure of an institution’s interconnectedness with the system of N financial institutions is then
given by
PCAS i,n :=
n∑
k=1
σ2i
σ2S
L2ikλk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
hn>H
where PCAS i,n is the contribution of institution i to the risk of the system, and hn is
∑n
k=1 λk∑N
k=1 λk
with
10 Following a suggestion in Billio et al. (2012), we set H = 0.33.
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a prescribed threshold H.11
The more interconnected an insurer is with the rest of the financial sector, the higher its sys-
temic relevance will be. We therefore expect our proxy for interconnectedness to enter our re-
gressions of ∆CoVaR with a significant negative sign. Similarly, we expect interconnectedness to
have a positive eﬀect on both MES and SRISK, since being more interconnected with the financial
system exposes insurers to contagion risks from other banks and insurers.
To proxy for the size of an insurer, we use the natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets.12
We expect insurer size to be an economically significant driver of systemic risk. On the one hand,
a larger company is less likely to suﬀer from cumulative losses due to its broader range of pooled
risks and better risk diversification. On the other hand, an insurer could become more systemically
relevant by being too-big-to-fail and too-complex-to-fail (see IAIS, 2012).
Another important explanatory variable in our regressions is an insurer’s leverage ratio. We
follow Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and approximate an insurer’s leverage
as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity. We have no prediction for the sign of the coeﬃcient on leverage in our
regression. High leverage is a factor that incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to in-
crease a firm’s profitability.13 In contrast, Vallascas and Hagendorﬀ (2011) argue that managers of
companies with high leverage could feel pressured by investors to provide enough liquid assets to
cover the payment of interests. Consequently, a higher leverage could exert a disciplining function
on managers leading to a decrease in an insurer’s total risk.
Furthermore, we employ several other insurer- and country-specific characteristics as con-
trol variables. We include the variable debt maturity which is defined as the ratio of total long
11 We calculate the proxy for interconnectedness using data on insurers and banks. To be precise, we employ data on
all insurance companies in our sample as well as data on all banks available from Datastream with total assets in
excess of $ 1 billion at the end of 2000. The total sample used for estimating the interconnectedness of individual
insurers comprises 1,491 banks and 253 insurers.
12 In our robustness checks, we use net revenues, given as the log value of an insurer’s total operating revenue, as
an alternative proxy for firm size.
13 Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Hovakimian et al. (2012)
who present empirical evidence that banks with low leverage during the crisis performed better and had a smaller
contribution to systemic risk.
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term debt to total debt. There exists a wide consensus among economists and regulators that
the dependence of certain banks and insurers on short-term funding exposed these institutions
to liquidity risks during the financial crisis and ultimately led to significant systemic risks (see
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Cummins and Weiss, 2014; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Conse-
quently, the IAIS has included the ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing and total
assets in its methodology as a key indicator of systemic relevance. We adopt their line of thought
but use total long-term debt instead of short term debt.
To include a proxy for an insurer’s investment success in our panel regression, we use the ratio
of investment income to net revenues. It is defined as the ratio of an insurer’s absolute investment
income to the sum of absolute investment income and absolute earned premiums. To characterize
the quality of the insurance portfolio, in our analysis we compute the insurer’s loss ratio, con-
structed by adding claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves and dividing by
premiums earned. We expect insurers with higher loss ratios to contribute more to systemic risk.
In our regressions, we also use an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of
common equity divided by the book value of common equity.
Next, we employ the insurers’ operating expense ratio, given by the ratio of operating expenses
to total assets, to control for the quality of management.14 Furthermore, we follow the reasoning
of the IAIS (2012) and control for the degree to which an insurer engages in non-traditional and
non-insurance activities. We use the variable Other income defined as other pre-tax income and
expenses besides operating income. If an insurer operates more outside the traditional insurance
business, e.g., by mimicking banks or becoming a central counterparty for credit derivatives, the
more will it be exposed to systemic risks from the financial sector as its interrelations with other
financial institutions increase. Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between other income
and systemic risk.
Another variable that captures the non-core activities of insurers is non-policyholder liabilities,
which is given by the total on balance-sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. We
14 In our robustness checks, we also compute the operating expense ratio by dividing operating expenses by earned
premiums.
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suspect a positive correlation of non-policyholder liabilities and systemic risk as policyholder lia-
bilities are indicative of traditional insurance activities (see IAIS, 2012). To proxy for an insurer’s
profitability and past performance in our regressions, we use the standard measures Return on Eq-
uity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Higher profits can act as a buﬀer against future losses thus
shielding an insurer against adverse eﬀects spilling over from the financial sector. Additionally,
we employ the quarterly buy-and-hold returns on an insurer’s stock as an independent variable. It
is very likely that insurers that performed well in the past will continue to perform well over time.
However, institutions that took on too many risks in the past could also stick to their culture of
risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and increase their exposure and contribution to systemic
risk. We therefore expect this measure to have a positive impact on the systemic risk of insurers.
Finally, we also consider macroeconomic and country-specific variables like the GDP growth
rate (in %) and the log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. Moreover, we employ a country’s
stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares traded in a given country divided by the
average market capitalization to proxy for the development of a country’s equity market (see, e.g.,
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Bartram et al., 2012).
2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables we use in our
analysis.
[Place Table I about here]
For our full sample of life and non-life insurers, we only find limited evidence of a systemic
importance of insurers. Although weakly economically significant, insurers had mean estimates of
MES and ∆CoVaR of only 1% during our full sample period. The summary statistics on SRISK
also underline the finding that the majority of insurers did not significantly contribute to the in-
stability of the financial sector. However, the minimum estimate of ∆CoVaR and the maximum
SRISK estimate show that at least some insurers contributed significantly to systemic risk at some
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point during our sample period. Intuitively, we would expect insurers to have experienced the ex-
treme values of systemic relevance during the financial crisis. This intuition is proven in Figure 1
in which we plot the time evolution of the three systemic risk measures we use over the course of
our complete sample period.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
We can see from Figure 1 that the mean MES is relatively constant over time, showing a sig-
nificant peak during the financial crisis. The exposure to systemic risk during this peak, however,
is highly economically significant with insurers, on average, suﬀering losses of 5% on their stocks
on those days the market plummeted. Some insurers were hit even harder with MES estimates of
up to 10%. The second plot for our estimates of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR shows a similar picture.
The contribution to systemic risk by insurers was low to non-existent until 2007 when both mean
and minimum ∆CoVaR estimates decreased dramatically. After the crisis, the average ∆CoVaR
of insurers increased again showing that the average contribution of insurers to systemic risk was
again limited. This result is corroborated by the plot of the insurers’ SRISK estimates.15
Although the summary statistics for our full sample yield some instructive information on our
sample, some of our variables diﬀer significantly for life and non-life insurers. To get a better
understanding of the composition of our sample, we therefore split our sample into life and non-
life insurers and compare selected summary statistics across both lines of business. The resulting
summary statistics and tests of the equality of sample means are presented in Table II. Summary
statistics are given separately for our full sample period in Panel A and for the sub-sample of the
quarters during the financial crisis in Panel B.
[Place Table II about here]
15 Further summary statistics for our explanatory variables given in Table I show that the average interconnectedness
of the insurers in our sample is limited. Some insurers, however, are strongly interconnected with the rest of the
global insurance sector. Most notably, AIG, AON, AXA, Genworth, and MunichRe are above the 99% quantile
of our interconnectedness variable. The average size of a sample insurer is ca. $ 65 billion. Note that our sample
includes both very small (5% quantile: $ 1.2 billion) and very large insurers (95% quantile: $ 331.6 billion).
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In Panel A of Table II, we compare the values of the systemic risk measures together with the
three main (presumed) determinants of systemic risk (size, leverage, and interconnectedness) for
the life and non-life insurers in our sample.
We can see from both Table II that the means of the variables diﬀer substantially for life and
non-life insurers. First, both the mean estimates of MES and ∆CoVaR are higher for life insur-
ers than for non-life insurers. In contrast, on average, non-life insurers have significantly higher
SRISK estimates than life insurers. These diﬀerences are statistically significant although the ab-
solute levels of the average contribution and exposure to systemic risk are again not economically
significant (at least not across our full panel).16
Concerning the potential drivers of systemic risk in insurance, the univariate analysis given in
Table II shows that non-life insurers are, on average, slightly more interconnected but are signif-
icantly smaller and less levered than life insurers. Non-life insurers have mean total assets of $
43 billion while life insurers are significantly larger with mean total assets of $ 94.66 billion. The
leverage of the average non-life insurer is 16 whereas the average life insurer has a leverage 56.
Although the mean estimates are again distorted in part by the presence of few extreme outliers,
the quantiles presented in Table II underline the finding that life insurer are significantly larger and
more levered.
Before turning to our panel regression analysis of the systemic relevance of global insurers,
we shortly comment on the subset of nine Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) as
identified by the Financial Stability Board in July 2013. In Table III, we repeat our analysis of the
summary statistics of our systemic risk measures and selected explanatory variables for the nine
G-SIIs.
[Place Table III about here]
During our full sample period, the nine G-SIIs had average MES and ∆CoVaR estimates that
did not significantly diﬀer from those of insurers that were not deemed to be systemically important
16 Furthermore, the diﬀerences in the mean SRISK and ∆CoVaR estimates are most likely due to the diﬀerent sizes
of the samples for which both measures can be computed.
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by the Financial Stability Board. However, global systemically important insurers had a signifi-
cantly higher mean SRISK than insurers in our full sample. Most importantly, however, average
estimates for the three systemic risk measures of G-SIIs increased significantly during the financial
crisis as shown in Figure 2.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
As expected, G-SIIs, on average also had significantly higher total assets and were more in-
terconnected. Interestingly, the mean leverage of the nine G-SIIs was lower than the leverage of
both the average life and non-life insurer in our full sample. Not surprisingly, all variables are on
average significantly higher during the crisis than in our full sample. Again, however, these uni-
variate results for our full sample period do not take into account the (possibly strong) correlations
between size, interconnectedness, and leverage.
3 The determinants of systemic risk of insurers
In this section, we investigate the question which factors determine an insurer’s contribution
and exposure to systemic risk. First, we comment on the results of our baseline panel regressions.
Afterwards, we report and comment the results of various robustness checks.
3.1 Panel Regressions
Based on the findings from our univariate analysis, we now perform a multivariate panel regres-
sion analysis of our sample of international insurers. In particular, we intend to test the hypothesis
that systemic risk in insurance is predominantly driven by an insurer’s size, its leverage, and its
interconnectedness with the rest of the insurance sector. In our baseline setting, we perform several
panel regressions with the three systemic risk measures introduced in Section 2 as our dependent
variables. The set of independent variables includes both the set of key features of systemic rele-
vance as proposed by the IAIS (2012) and various control variables as outlined in Section 2.3 and
Table A.2. The econometric strategy we use is illustrated below.
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S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
(1)
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter
t and Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-specific and country-
specific control variables, respectively. To mitigate the possibility of reverse causality between our
dependent and explanatory variables driving our results, we lag all explanatory variables based on
accounting statements by two quarters. The interconnectedness measure and country controls are
lagged by one quarter. Furthermore, we perform separate regressions for life and non-life insurers
to account for systematic diﬀerences in accounting in diﬀerent lines of insurance business. In
addition, we estimate all panel regressions with clustered standard errors on the country level and
with insurer- and time-fixed eﬀects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The results of our
baseline regressions are presented in Table IV.
[Place Table IV about here]
Starting with regressions (1) and (2) of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR, we can see that neither the life
insurers’ interconnectedness nor their size is a significant driver of the contribution to systemic risk.
This first finding is in striking contrast to the hypotheses formulated by the IAIS on the pivotal role
of size and interconnectedness for an insurer’s systemic importance. For the leverage of a firm,
we find that leverage enters the regressions with a negative sign. Our results suggest that the more
levered a life insurer is, the more it contributes to the system’s fragility. This result is statistically
significant at the 10%- and 1% level, respectively. Furthermore, the eﬀect is also economically
significant. For life insurers, an increase in leverage by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of
-13% in ∆CoVaR (1308.26 × -0.0001) whereas for non-life insurers, such an increase is associated
with an increase in the contribution to systemic risk by 4% (200.04 × -0.0002). Our result implies
that the use of high leverage in the insurance business therefore decreases the value of ∆CoVaR
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and consequently increases a non-life insurer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Next, we report the results of our regressions (3) and (4) of the insurers’ Marginal Expected
Shortfall as the dependent variable. Interestingly, we find a positive relation between the intercon-
nectedness of a non-life insurer and its exposure to systemic risk spilling over from the insurance
sector. We thus conclude that being highly interconnected does not necessarily lead to a signifi-
cantly higher contribution to systemic fragility, but rather to a higher exposure to adverse spillover
eﬀects. Additionally, leverage enters both regressions for life and non-life insurers with a statis-
tically and economically significant positive sign. In our regressions, a one standard deviation
increase in the leverage of life insurers is associated with a 26.1% higher MES and therefore an
increase of an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk (1308.26 × 0.0002). For comparison, a one
standard deviation increase in the leverage of a non-life insurer is associated with an 8% increase
in MES (200.04 × 0.0004). In line with our expectation, higher leverage thus appears to signifi-
cantly increase an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk. Higher operating to total assets ratios are
associated with a higher MES of insurers.
Finally, in model specifications (5) and (6), we employ the insurers’ SRISK as the dependent
variable. Underlining our previous findings from the regressions of ∆CoVaR, we find no evidence
for the hypothesis that the contribution of insurers to systemic risk is significantly aﬀected by
the interconnectedness of an individual life insurer within financial system. For non-life insurers,
we again find leverage to have a mitigating eﬀect on systemic risk with the eﬀect being both
statistically and economically significant. However, in contrast to our previous regressions, insurer
size is now statistically and economically significantly related to the SRISK of insurers. For the life
insurers in our sample, we find an increase of total assets to be associated with an increase in SRISK
of approx. 196 million (194.91 × 1.0075). For non-life insurers, we find the economic significance
of size to be even larger with a one standard deviation increase in size being associated with an
increase in SRISK by approx. 750 million (134.65 × 5.5704). These findings for SRISK have to
be taken with careful consideration, however, since the adjusted R-squared in the regressions of
SRISK is considerably lower than in the regressions of MES and ∆CoVaR.
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3.2 Additional analyses
The results of our baseline regressions have produced only weak evidence that size, intercon-
nectedness, and leverage are fundamental drivers of systemic risk in insurance. To get a deeper
understanding of the relation between idiosyncratic insurer characteristics and systemic risk, we
perform several additional analyses in this subsection.
First, we examine the question whether the exposure and contribution of large insurers to sys-
temic risk are driven by diﬀerent factors than the systemic risk measures of insurers in our full
sample. To this end, we restrict our sample to insurer-quarter observations of institutions in the top
75% quantile of total assets. The motivation behind our analysis is that the relation between some
of our explanatory variables and the systemic risk of an insurer might be mitigated or exacerbated
by the insurer’s size. The results for the regression using insurers in the top total assets quartile
only are presented in Table V.
[Place Table V about here]
Several of the results from our baseline regressions carry over to our analysis of large insur-
ers. For example, the inferences for the insurers’ leverage remain more or less unchanged. Higher
leverage increases both the contribution and the exposure of large life and non-life insurers to sys-
temic risk. While leverage is positively related to the purely equity-based measures of systemic
risk, we find a significant negative correlation between leverage and SRISK as our third measure
of systemic risk. However, in regression (2) in Table V we find one striking diﬀerence. In con-
trast to our baseline regressions, the interconnectedness of an insurer is now positively related to
its contribution to systemic risk. An increased interconnectedness of large insurers induces more
contribution to overall systemic risk. This is intuitive, since an interconnected insurance com-
pany could possibly contribute to systemic risk, but only if it is relevant or large enough to have
devastating eﬀects through a default. Similarly to the analysis of our full sample, insurer size is
significant in the regression of the SRISK of non-life insurers. Furthermore, and in line with our
expectation, we find higher loss ratios to be positively associated with the contribution of large
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insurers to systemic risk.
Next, we address the question whether the drivers of systemic risk in insurance diﬀer across
countries. In fact, it is very possible that insurance companies and even whole sectors function
in a diﬀerent way than their counterparts in foreign countries. Even more importantly, insurance
regulation diﬀers substantially from country to country. Although we control for these systematic
diﬀerences by the use of country-fixed eﬀects in our robustness checks, it is nevertheless instruc-
tive to analyze these country diﬀerences in the relation between systemic risk and the insurers’
idiosyncratic characteristics in more detail. Our sample is composed of 95 insurers with headquar-
ters located in the United States and 158 insurers from other countries. To analyze the diﬀerential
drivers of systemic risk, we estimate separate panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
The results are given in Table VI.
[Place Table VI about here]
For U.S. based non-life insurers, interconnectedness enters the regression of ∆CoVaR with a
positive coeﬃcient that is statistically significant at the 1% level while for non-U.S. insurers it is
significant for both lines of business. On the other hand, interconnectedness seems to slightly in-
crease the values of SRISK for non-life insurers in the U.S. and for life insurers outside the United
States. These mixed findings indicate no clear trend on the impact of our interconnectedness mea-
sure on the contribution of insurers to systemic risk. With the exception of the regressions of the
SRISK estimates of non-life insurers outside the U.S., total assets is not a statistically significant
determinant of systemic risk. In contrast, leverage is significantly related to the exposure to sys-
temic risk of non-life insurers (U.S. and non-U.S.) and life insurers (only non-U.S.). Our results
suggest that the impact of leverage on the exposure and contribution of systemic risk does not vary
across countries or lines of business.
Finally, we investigate the question whether our results change significantly if we restrict our
sample to the time period of the financial crisis. In particular, we hypothesize that size, intercon-
nectedness, and leverage might only have been key drivers of systemic risk in insurance during the
financial crisis. To this end, in Table VII, we repeat our previous baseline regressions but restrict
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our sample to a smaller time period covering the period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010 (i.e., the time
around and during the financial crisis).
[Place Table VII about here]
This time, we find no statistically significant impact of interconnectedness on any of the sys-
temic risk measures. Again, insurer size does not appear to be systematically related to systemic
risk of insurers except for SRISK of non-life insurers where we, again, find a positive relation.
While the signs of the coeﬃcients for leverage remain the same, we only find a statistically sig-
nificant impact on systemic risk for non-life insurers. The economic significance of this eﬀect is,
however, moderate with a one standard deviation increase in leverage causing a change of almost
minus one percent in ∆CoVaR during the crisis period (23.42 × -0.0003=-0.7026). In the cross-
section of non-life insurers’ MES during the crisis period, a one standard deviation increase in
leverage is associated with an 1.4% higher exposure to systemic risk (23.42 × 0.0006).
3.3 Insurers and the Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector
While we have investigated the factors influencing the marginal systemic risk of insurers at
the micro-level, we have not yet addressed the overall level of systemic risk that emanates from
the insurance sector (and its possible macroeconomic consequences). In our final analysis, we
therefore employ a macro-level measure of systemic risk to capture the insurance sector’s propen-
sity to cause real macroeconomic downturns. More, specifically, we employ the CATFIN measure
introduced by Allen et al. (2012) and compare their results with the CATFIN measure estimated
for our sample of insurers. CATFIN is defined as the average of three Value-at-Risk estimates of
monthly stock returns in excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. We fit the Generalized Pareto
Distribution and the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution to generate Value-at-Risk estimates
from the cross-section of our insurers’ monthly stock returns at the 99% level. Additionally, the
third estimate is from the cross-sectional 1% sample quantile. The resulting CATFIN measures are
plotted in Figure 3 for the time period 07/2001 to 12/2012.
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[Place Figure 3 about here]
From the figure, we can see that the time evolution of the two time series of CATFIN estimates
are very similar, but vary in magnitude. Before the crisis, the estimated index values are closely
together until the beginning of the crisis. While the insurer CATFIN peaks at around 60% in the
beginning of 2009, the original estimates from Allen et al. (2012) reach a maximum of over 70%.
The monthly values for the original CATFIN index seem to be higher than the insurer CATFIN for
the most part after the crisis. Despite the small diﬀerence in the magnitude of the peaks of both
CATFIN time series, the plot in Figure 3 underlines the finding that the overall level of systemic
risk in the insurance sector was significant and high, especially during the crisis. However, another
important insight from Figure 3 is that the overall level of systemic risk in the insurance sector
fails to predict economic downturns, since insurer stocks seem to lag behind the overall financial
sector.
3.4 Robustness checks
We also estimate regressions in which we employ alternative measures of an insurer’s size
(net revenues instead of total assets), profitability (ROE instead of ROA) and investment activity
(ratio of the insurers investment income to net revenues instead of the ratio of the insurers absolute
investment income to the sum of absolute investment income and absolute earned premiums),
respectively. Additional regressions using the beta of an insurer’s stock yield no change in our
results. As mentioned before, we also replace total assets with premiums earned in the calculation
of our variable operating expenses. However, our previous conclusions remain valid.
Next, it could be argued that our results are driven by the specific manner in which we estimate
the Marginal Expected Shortfall and the other systemic risk measures. To control for this potential
bias, we recalculate MES and ∆CoVaR using three alternative indexes. To be precise, we employ
the World DS Full Lin Insurer Index, the MSCI World Banks Index and the MSCI World Insurance
Index taken from Datastream. The results show that our conclusions remain unchanged.
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Another potential concern with our analysis could be that some of the insurers in our sample
might in fact just be locally rather than internationally active market participants. Consequently,
the presence of local insurers in our sample could bias our results on systemic risk as the systemic
relevance of locally active insurers should generally lower than for globally important insurers.
However, we believe that the inclusion of locally active insurers in the context of our analysis
is sensible for the following reasons. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that insurers with
insurance activities in only their home country contribute to global systemic risk due to oﬀ-balance
sheet and non-insurance activities. Second, sheer size and relevance in an insurer’s home country
might be enough to destabilize a nation’s economy and thus cause global financial stability.17
Nevertheless, we perform an additional robustness check in which we include in our baseline
regressions the variable Foreign sales, which is the ratio of an insurer’s international sales to its
total sales, to control for business activities abroad. Including this factor does neither change our
main results, nor is the variable significant in any of the regressions.
Additionally, we employ GMM-sys regressions (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) that include one
lag of our dependent variables and explanatory variables lagged by one quarter. In these regres-
sions, double-lagged values of the insurer characteristics are used as instruments for estimation.
In doing so, we mitigate concerns on possible endogeneity in our regression models. Our main
results, however, remain valid.
Finally, we winsorize all data at the 1% and 99% quantiles to minimize a possible bias due to
outliers and reestimate all our regressions using winsorized data. The results of these alternative
regressions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life
insurers to global systemic risk in the period from 2000 to 2012. As our main result, we find sys-
17 The anecdotal evidence of the inclusion of the Ping An Insurance Group in the list of the nine G-SIIs underlines
this notion.
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temic risk in the international insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the
literature for banks in our full sample. During the financial crisis, however, insurers did contribute
significantly to the instability of the financial sector. Further, we conclude that systemic risk of
insurers is determined by various factors including an insurer’s interconnectedness and leverage,
the magnitudes and significances of these eﬀects, however, diﬀer depending on the systemic risk
measure used and with the analyzed insurer line and geographic region. Most interestingly, we
find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant driver of
the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk
appears to be driven by (among others) leverage, loss ratios, and the insurer’s funding fragility.
Our results also show that life insurers do not contribute significantly more to global systemic
risk than non-life insurers. In addition, there seems to be little diﬀerence in the interconnected-
ness of life and non-life insurers. In our study, we find no convincing evidence in support of the
hypothesis that insurer size is a fundamental driver of the contribution of an insurer to systemic
risk. In contrast to the banking sector, we show that the insurance sector predominantly suﬀers
from being exposed to systemic risk, rather than adding to the financial system’s fragility. Finally,
our study reveals that both the systemic risk exposure and the contribution of international insurers
were limited prior to the financial crisis with all measures of systemic risk increasing significantly
during the crisis. In contrast to the banking sector, however, systemic risk in the insurance sector
does not appear to lead but rather follow macroeconomic downturns as evidenced by our analysis
of the insurers’ CATFIN estimates.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Sample Insurance Companies.
The appendix lists all international insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample is con-
structed by first selecting all international insurers from the country and dead-firm lists of Thomson Reuters Financial
Datastream. The list is then corrected for all companies for which stock price and balance sheet data are not available
from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Worldscope. The names of the companies are retrieved from the
Worldscope database (item WC06001).
ALEA GROUP HOLDINGS AXA ASIA PACIFIC ERGO PREVIDENZA
CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC AXA LEBENSVERSICH ERGO-VERSICHERUNG
21ST CENTURY INS AXA KONZERN AG ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS
ACE LIMITED AXA PORTUGAL SEGUROS ERIE INDEMNITY
AEGON N.V. AXA VERSICHERUNG AG ETHNIKI GREEK INS
AFFIN-ACF HOLDINGS AXIS CAPITAL HLDG EULER HERMES
AFLAC INCORPORATED BALOISE HOLDING AG EVEREST RE GROUP
AFRICAN LIFE BENFIELD GROUP LTD FAIRFAX FIN’L HLDGS
AGEAS SA BRIT INSURANCE HOLD FBD HOLDINGS PLC
ASSURANCES GENERALES CAPITAL ALLIANCE FBL FINANCIAL GROUP
AIOI INSURANCE CASH.LIFE AG FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES
ALFA CORPORATION CATHAY FINANCIAL FINAXA SA
ALLEANZA ASSICUR. CATLIN GROUP LTD FIRST FIRE & MARINE
ALLEGHANY CORP CATTOLICA ASS FONDIARIA - SAI SPA
ALLIANZ SE CESKA POJISTOVNA A.S FOYER S.A.
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERS. CHALLENGER FIN’L SVC FPIC INSURANCE GROUP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION CHESNARA PLC FRIENDS PROVIDENT
ALM BRAND AS CHINA LIFE INSURANCE FUBON FINANCIAL
ALTERRA CAPITAL CHINA TAIPING INSU FUJI FIRE& MARINE INS
AMBAC FINANCIAL CHUBB CORP (THE) GENERALI (SCHWEIZ)
AMERICAN NATIONAL CINCINNATI FINL CORP GENERALI DEUTSCH
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CLAL INSURANCE ENT GENERALI HOLDING VIE
AMERICAN EQUITY INV CNA FINANCIAL CORP GENWORTH FIN’L, INC.
AMERICAN FIN’L GROUP CNA SURETY CORP GLOBAL INDEMNITY
AMERICAN INT’L GROUP CNO FINANCIAL GRUPO NACIONAL
AMERUS GROUP CO CNP ASSURANCES GRUPO PROFUTURO
AMLIN PLC CODAN A/S GREAT EASTERN HLDGS
AMP LIMITED GROUPE COFACE GREAT WEST LIFECO
ANN & LIFE RE HLDGS COMMERCE GROUP, INC. GRUPO CATALANA
AON PLC MILANO ASSICURAZIONI GREAT AMERICAN FIN’L
ARAB INSURANCE GROUP COX INSURANCE HANNOVER RUECK SE
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP DAI-ICHI LIFE INSU HANOVER INSURANCE
ARGONAUT GROUP, INC. DAIDO LIFE INSURANCE HAREL INSUR INVEST
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER DBV WINTERTHUR HARLEYSVILLE GROUP
ASIA FINANCIAL HLDGS DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP HARTFORD FINL SRVC
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLD DELTA LLOYD LEBENS HCC INS HOLDINGS
ASSICUR GENERALI SPA DONGBU INSURANCE CO. HELVETIA HOLDING
ASSURANT INC DEUTSCHE AERZTEVERS HILB, ROGAL & HOBBS
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD E-L FINANCIAL CORP. HILLTOP HOL
AVIVA PLC EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS HISCOX PLC
AXA SA ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HORACE MANN EDUCATRS
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Table A.1: Sample Insurance Companies (continued).
HYUNDAI M & F INS. OLD REPUBLIC INTL SWISS RE
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE PARTNERRE LTD. TAIWAN LIFE INSURANC
INFINITY PROP & CAS PENN TREATY AMERICAN TAIYO LIFE INSURANCE
ING GROEP N.V. PERMANENT TSB GROUP TOKIO MARINE
INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PHILADELPHIA CORP TONG YANG LIFE INS
INTACT FINANCIAL PHOENIX COMPANIES TOPDANMARK A/S
IPC HOLDINGS, LTD. PHOENIX HOLDINGS TORCHMARK CORP
JARDINE LLOYD PICC PROPERTY TORO ASSICURAZIONI
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP PING AN INSURANCE TOWER LTD
JOHN HANCOCK FIN SVC PLAT UNDERWRITERS TRANSATLANTIC HLDGS
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS PMA CAPITAL CORP TRAVELERS COS
KEMPER POHJOLA-YHTYMA OYJ TRAVELERS PROPERTY
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL POWER CORP OF CANADA TRYG A/S
KOELNISCHE RUECKVER. POWER FINANCIAL CORP UICI
KOREAN REINSURANCE PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA UNIPOL GRUPPO FIN
LANDAMERICA FINL GRP PRESIDENTIAL LIFE UNIQA INSUR
LEGAL & GEN’L GRP PRINCIPAL FINL GROUP UNITED FIRE
LIBERTY GROUP LTD PROASSURANCE CORP PROVIDENT COMPANIES
LIBERTY HOLDINGS PROGRESSIVE CORP WAADT VERSICHERUNGEN
LIG INSURANCE CO LTD PROMINA GROUP VESTA INSURANCE GRP
LINCOLN NAT’L CORP PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP VIENNA INSURANCE
LOEWS CORPORATION PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE VITTORIA ASSICURAZIO
MAA GROUP PRUDENTIAL PLC W R BERKLEY CORP.
MANULIFE FINANCIAL PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL WELLINGTON
MAPFRE SA QBE INSURANCE GROUP WESCO FINANCIAL CORP
MARKEL CORP RIUNIONE ADRIATICA WHITE MOUNTAIN INSUR
MARSH & MCLENNAN CO. REINSURANCE GROUP WILLIS GROUP
MBIA INC RENAISSANCERE HLDGS WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LE
MEDIOLANUM RHEINLAND HOLDING XL GROUP PLC
MENORAH MIVTACHIM RLI CORP ZENITH NATIONAL
MERCURY GENERAL CORP RSA INSURANCE GROUP ZURICH INSURANCE
METLIFE INC SAFECO CORPORATION
MIDLAND COMPANY SAFETY INSURANCE GP
MIGDAL INSURAN & FIN SAMPO OYJ
MIIX GROUP, INC SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE
MNI HOLDINGS BHD SOUTH AFRICAN NAT’L
MONTPELIER RE HLDGS SCHWEIZERISCHE NAT
MONY GROUP INC. SCOR SE
MS& AD INSURANCE SCOTTISH RE GROUP
MUENCHENER SELECTIVE INSURANCE
NATIONAL WESTERN SHIN KONG FINANCIAL
NATIONWIDE FIN’L SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC SOMPO JAPAN INSURANC
NIPPONKOA INS SAINT JAMES’S PLACE
NISSAY DOWA GEN STANCORP FINANCIAL
NISSHIN FIRE/MAR INS STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
NUERNBERGER BET.-AG STOREBRAND ASA
ODYSSEY RE SUL AMERICA SEGUROS
OHIO CASUALTY CORP SUN LIFE FINANCIAL
OLD MUTUAL PLC SWISS LIFE HOLDING
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Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), measured as the
diﬀerence of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sector index conditional on the distress
of a particular insurer and the VaR of the sector index conditional on the median state of
the insurer.
Datastream, own calc.
MES Quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined byAcharya et al. (2010) as the average
return on an individual insurer’s stock on the days the World Datastream Bank index
experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
SRISK Average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al.
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The SRISK estimate for insurer i at time t is
given by S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
)
− (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t where k is a regulatory
capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of debt, LRMESi,t is the long
run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · MES ), MES is the estimated
Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the insurer’s market value of equity.
Datastream, Worldscope
(WC03351, WC08001),
own. calc.
Insurer characteristics
Beta Beta of the capital asset pricing model measuring the market sensitivity of a firm and a
local market index of the insurer’s country.
Worldscope (WC09802).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255).
Foreign sales International sales divided by net revenues (times 100) Worldscope (WC08731).
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012). PCAS is constructed using a decompo-
sition of the variance-covariance matrix of the insurers’ daily, standardized stock returns.
Datastream, own calc.
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity.
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves to earned premiums. Worldscope (WC15549).
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Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Insurer characteristics
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Worldscope (WC07210,
WC03501).
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope (WC01001).
Non-Policyholder Liabili-
ties
Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030).
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income. Worldscope (WC01262).
Performance Quarterly buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock. Datastream, own calc.
Return on Assets Return of the insurer on it’s total assets after taxes (in %). Worldscope (WC08326).
Return on Equity An insurer’s earnings per share during the last 12 months over the prorated book value
per share times 100 (in %).
Worldscope (WC08372).
Total assets Natural logarithm of a insurer’s total assets. Worldscope (WC02999).
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database (World
Bank).
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database (World
Bank)
Stock market turnover Total value of shares traded in a given country divided by the average market capitaliza-
tion.
WDI database (World
Bank).
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the systemic risk measures in the period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES), SRISK, and
∆CoVaR over our full sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 international life and non-life
insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure (black line) is plotted against the corresponding 10%
and 90% percent quantiles (grey lines). All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of systemic risk measures for (systemically relevant) insurers in the
period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES), SRISK, and
∆CoVaR over a sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 international life and non-life in-
surers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure in each quarter is given for a sample of 253 international
insurers (yellow shaded area) and for the nine insurers identified as global systemically important by the IAIS (2012)
(black bars). All data are winsorized at the 1% level. Variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of CATFIN.
This figure plots the time evolution of the CATFIN measure introduced in Allen et al. (2012). CATFIN is calculated by
averaging the three Value-at-Risk estimates from the Generalized Pareto Distribution, the Skewed Generalized Error
Distribution, and the nonparametric sample quantiles for the cross-section of stock returns of financial institutions in
excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. The red line represents the CATFIN measure for the cross section of insurers
in our sample and the black line is the original CATFIN measure calculated in Allen et al. (2012) taken from the
authors’ website at http://faculty.msb.edu/tgb27/workingpapers.html. The sample used for calculating the CATFIN of
the insurance sector consists of 253 international life and non-life insurers.
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Table I: Descriptive statistics.
The table presents descriptive statistics of the quarterly estimates of diﬀerent systemic risk measures for a sample of 253 international insurers. The sample period
runs from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. Additionally, the table presents descriptive statistics for our set of explanatory variables. We report the number of observations,
minimum and maximum values, percentiles and moments. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
Percentiles Moments
Obs Min 1th 5th 20th 80th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
MES 12,808 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.01 0.02 3.44 35.53
∆CoVaR 4,893 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -3.90 29.98
SRISK (in billions) 8,997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 2.46 12.30 42.09 166.22 2.80 8.50 7.56 81.36
Interconnectedness 11,361 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.37 123.99 399,010.80 386.98 8,929.08 29.26 982.91
Total assets (in billions) 10,998 0.02 0.59 1.18 29.03 61.37 331.62 865.13 2,076.19 65.63 165.79 5.40 38.05
Leverage 12,066 1.01 1.32 1.77 3.10 13.37 30.41 86.80 44,180.69 30.27 819.12 52.16 2,796.82
Debt maturity 11,104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.32 -1.45 0.78
Foreign sales 7,131 -63.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.42 82.85 109.82 202.64 23.63 30.11 1.23 1.26
Investment success 12,065 -22.10 0.04 0.23 0.59 0.89 0.95 1.03 4.13 0.71 0.49 -34.67 1,614.19
Loss ratio 11,994 -1,717.91 3.39 38.53 64.26 109.65 196.19 770.70 8,439.29 107.48 211.37 20.09 681.64
Market-to-book 12,038 -14.10 0.26 0.55 0.91 2.27 4.16 7.49 45.12 1.78 1.67 8.32 167.10
Non-policyholder liabilities 12,025 0.56 1.01 1.05 1.12 1.70 4.78 35.67 1,144.63 4.03 35.51 21.25 524.18
Operating expenses 12,510 -0.18 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.32 0.54 0.78 1.39 0.23 0.16 2.06 7.81
Other income (in millions) 12,669 -4.87 -0.93 -0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.17 1.19 17.95 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.00
ROA 12,423 -30.22 -5.56 -1.09 0.39 3.44 6.94 10.90 38.08 1.88 3.22 1.30 30.09
Performance 12,744 -0.91 -0.43 -0.25 -0.09 0.12 0.30 0.57 10.64 0.02 0.21 11.83 559.55
Net Revenues (in billions) 10,954 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.73 11.40 44.61 105.30 172.37 9.70 19.15 3.95 18.57
ROE 9,853 -77.86 -66.22 -6.84 5.66 16.29 25.82 34.29 36.69 10.16 12.84 -3.39 19.27
GDP Growth 12,598 -8.54 -5.49 -3.11 0.81 4.10 5.54 9.30 14.78 2.21 2.57 -0.45 2.25
Inflation 12,598 -14.45 -2.22 -1.20 0.88 3.12 6.01 8.86 27.57 2.15 2.16 1.49 12.38
Stock market turnover 12,648 0.15 1.99 6.80 63.14 189.07 348.58 404.07 404.07 130.21 85.64 1.17 1.78
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Table II: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: life and non-life insurer.
The table compares the characteristics of insurers in the life insurance sector relative to those in the non-life sector. Our sample consists of 253 international
insurers (listed in Appendix A.1) and covers the period from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). We report the minimum,
maximum, mean, 5%- and 95%-quantiles, and the standard deviation of the variables. The equality of means of the diﬀerent variables is tested using Welch’s t test
for unequal sample sizes and possibly unequal variances of the two samples. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2. ***,**,* denote estimates
that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Non-life Life
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. t-statistic
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 6,386 -0.082 0.003 0.014 0.019 0.452 0.020 4,991 -0.047 0.004 0.016 0.023 0.304 0.020 -7.274***
∆CoVaR 2,272 -0.119 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 0.010 1,582 -0.089 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.010 2.331**
SRISK (in billions) 5,150 0.000 0.103 3.210 1.718 1.662 10.280 3,847 0.000 0.108 2.242 1.836 79.23 5.190 5.842***
Interconnectedness 6,462 0.000 0.000 679.690 0.100 399,010.800 11,831.450 4,899 0.000 0.000 0.879 0.095 350.900 9.680 4.612***
Total assets (in billions) 6,180 0.02 2.75 43.00 24.13 1,483.00 134.65 4,818 0.11 7.22 94.66 93.28 2,076.00 194.91 -15.71***
Leverage 5,974 1.01 2.89 16.01 8.61 7,100.00 200.04 4,588 1.25 6.25 56.52 16.22 44,180.00 1,308.26 -2.08**
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 520 -0.032 0.012 0.034 0.049 0.195 0.031 388 -0.032 0.009 0.040 0.059 0.227 0.039 -2.591***
∆CoVaR 109 -0.100 -0.021 -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 0.017 84 -0.089 -0.024 -0.020 -0.009 -0.003 0.019 0.957
SRISK (in millions) 369 0.000 0.440 5.988 4.863 88.650 13.040 262 0.000 0.376 4.970 5.156 79.230 9.330 1.144
Interconnectedness 529 0.000 0.000 773.100 0.070 294,900.000 13,698.390 405 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.205 0.098 202.800 10.710
Total assets (in billions) 443 0.16 3.63 47.89 27.45 1476.00 143.59 328 0.73 12.38 126.30 125.90 2,076.00 248.28 -5.12***
Leverage 443 1.32 3.02 11.67 9.88 210.60 23.42 322 1.50 7.18 297.00 22.93 44,180.00 3,475.01 -1.47
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Table III: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: Global Systemically Important Insurers.
This table shows the respective descriptive statistics for the nine global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) as defined by the international association of
insurance supervisors (IAIS) in the period from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). The nine G-SIIs are Allianz, American
International Group, Assicurazioni Generali, Aviva, Axa, MetLife, Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Prudential Financial and Prudential. All
variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
G-SIIs
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev.
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 434 -0.001 0.011 0.028 0.035 0.452 0.031
∆CoVaR 249 -0.119 -0.014 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.012
SRISK (in billions) 378 0.000 2.065 18.209 27.387 125.494 21.956
Interconnectedness 460 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.094 30.800 1.785
Total assets (in billions) 424 24.55 293.00 521.20 730.90 1483.00 315.38
Leverage 416 1.36 3.71 10.69 14.67 55.08 10.76
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 36 0.000 0.035 0.065 0.090 0.169 0.042
∆CoVaR 20 -0.100 -0.039 -0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.025
SRISK (in billions) 28 0.037 6.544 25.198 36.902 79.229 24.351
Interconnectedness 32 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.037 0.850 0.239
Total assets (in billions) 32 107.80 438.20 615.00 844.80 1476.20 330.19
Leverage 32 2.918 16.909 42.930 32.141 210.612 62.609
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Table IV: Baseline panel regressions.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of
international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are
estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed eﬀects and with clustered standard errors on the country level. The estimated
model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t and
Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-specific and country-specific control variables.
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers and 141 international non-life
insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. P-values are reported in parentheses. All insurer characteristics
based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged
by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote
coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R 2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 11.6000 2.6100*** -11.7000 0.0078** -2132.9000 7.0100**
(0.728) (0.002) (0.308) (0.011) (0.556) (0.047)
Total assets -0.0030 0.0005 0.0049* -0.0004 1.0075* 5.5704**
(0.216) (0.568) (0.051) (0.820) (0.094) (0.016)
Leverage -0.0001* -0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0004*** -0.0072 -0.1228***
(0.056) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.443) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0019 0.0009 0.0754 -3.1216*
(0.403) (0.485) (0.309) (0.580) (0.837) (0.097)
Investment success 0.0008 -0.0067 -0.0049*** 0.0091 -0.4141 -2.1429
(0.652) (0.281) (0.004) (0.221) (0.434) (0.484)
Loss ratio -0.0057 0.0462* -0.0018 0.0006 0.0544 -1.5115
(0.183) (0.067) (0.128) (0.898) (0.666) (0.156)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0005* 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0002 0.1047 0.0943
(0.096) (0.348) (0.177) (0.155) (0.176) (0.486)
Non-policyholder liabilities -0.1759** 0.1.1890** -0.0022 -0.0424 -4.2576*** 14.8805
(0.030) (0.035) (0.637) (0.376) (0.003) (0.611)
Operating expenses -0.0291** -0.0041 0.0253** 0.0155* -1.9027 14.5905
(0.034) (0.304) (0.022) (0.050) (0.437) (0.101)
Other income -0.6770 0.0184 1.4500 -0.0290 267.000 523.000
(0.226) (0.875) (0.441) (0.947) (0.521) (0.461)
ROA 0.2000 0.0405 0.1811 0.0467 15.8181 156.7285
(0.649) (0.802) (0.512) (0.820) (0.693) (0.147)
Performance -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.3072 0.1843
(0.409) (0.471) (0.158) (0.966) (0.165) (0.726)
GDP growth 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0796 -0.0908
(0.150) (0.365) (0.516) (0.499) (0.150) (0.424)
Inflation -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0011*** -0.0269 -0.2008*
(0.397) (0.750) (0.074) (0.002) (0.648) (0.051)
Stock market turnover 0.0023 -0.0108 0.0460*** 0.0452*** 1.9347 26.7704***
(0.801) (0.225) (0.008) (0.003) (0.520) (0.000)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 925 1,333 2,658 3,569 2,508 3,426
Adj. R2 0.5865 0.5752 0.4422 0.4225 0.2040 0.1412
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Table V: Panel regressions - Large insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of
international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are
estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed eﬀects and with clustered standard errors on the country level. The estimated
model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t and
Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-specific and country-specific control variables.
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers and 141 international non-life
insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. In contrast to our baseline setting, in these regressions, we only
use insurer-quarters of insurers in the top total assets quartile. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer
characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control
are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R 2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 1.1058 -0.2942** 0.0017 0.4796 0.3641 -205.6195
(0.179) (0.023) (0.120) (0.112) (0.337) (0.500)
Total assets -0.0008 -0.0037 0.0016 -0.0026 4.6792 11.8426***
(0.885) (0.117) (0.626) (0.415) (0.122) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** -0.0616 -0.0758**
(0.297) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.242) (0.047)
Debt maturity -0.0032 0.0032 -0.0007 -0.0082 -1.3610 -19.8851
(0.243) (0.292) (0.867) (0.208) (0.330) (0.105)
Investment success -0.0114 -0.0347** 0.0174 0.0232 3.8998 -20.3975**
(0.212) (0.032) (0.147) (0.418) (0.380) (0.023)
Loss ratio -0.1341** -0.0751* -0.0090** 0.0359 0.0280 1.9320
(0.022) (0.097) (0.028) (0.362) (0.987) (0.892)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0026** -0.0013 0.0004 0.0021 -0.4833 8.5890*
(0.011) (0.447) (0.605) (0.547) (0.294) (0.065)
Non-policyholder liabilities 0.4520 -0.9806 0.0398 -0.1975 10.0329 -59.2137
(0.685) (0.306) (0.341) (0.800) (0.367) (0.877)
Operating expenses 0.0220 -0.0730*** 0.0331** 0.0722 14.8526 79.9298*
(0.482) (0.004) (0.025) (0.119) (0.165) (0.056)
Other income 3.4200*** 0.0539 0.4310 0.1690 3670.0000*** -504.0000
(0.003) (0.767) (0.872) (0.774) (0.004) (0.306)
ROA -0.6000* -0.7000 0.5000* 2.0000* 167.0000 993.2000**
(0.078) (0.183) (0.099) (0.070) (0.290) (0.038)
Performance -0.0046** 0.0047** -0.0081** -0.0147*** -0.9752 -2.4596
(0.037) (0.024) (0.013) (0.005) (0.132) (0.298)
GDP growth 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.2241 -0.6056
(0.984) (0.421) (0.233) (0.837) (0.115) (0.337)
Inflation -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.6069** 0.7485
(0.465) (0.120) (0.415) (0.670) (0.019) (0.494)
Stock market turnover -0.0184 -0.0392** 0.0194 0.0629* -8.2560 68.5784***
(0.167) (0.027) (0.315) (0.055) (0.185) (0.002)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 377 296 858 560 843 554
Adj. R2 0.630 0.840 0.556 0.512 0.300 0.395
37
Table VI: Panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of
systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed eﬀects and with clustered standard errors on
the country level. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t and Insurer controls i,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1
are various firm-specific and country-specific control variables. The samples include insurer-quarter observations of 95 U.S. and 158 non-U.S. insurers over the
time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. P-values are reported in parentheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters and
Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote
coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R 2 is adjusted R-squared.
US Non-US
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
Interconnectedness 34.3000 2.8900*** -129.6 0.0072* 645.1000 5.4200* 2.8900*** -6.1100** 0.0072* 0.6020 5.4200* -142.4000
(0.470) (0.000) (0.295) (0.085) (0.810) (0.064) (0.000) (0.041) (0.085) (0.771) (0.064) (0.833)
Total assets 0.0005 0.0026 0.0070 -0.0021 0.9090 1.6734 0.0026 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0012 1.6734 6.1613**
(0.952) (0.126) (0.105) (0.340) (0.272) (0.124) (0.126) (0.919) (0.340) (0.555) (0.124) (0.021)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0020 -0.1180*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0006** -0.1180*** 0.0368
(0.545) (0.000) (0.537) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.573)
Other control varialbes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258 812 723 1,917 678 1,807 812 521 1,917 1,652 1,807 1,619
Adj. R2 0.589 0.574 0.452 0.540 0.379 0.221 0.574 0.689 0.540 0.377 0.221 0.195
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Table VII: Panel regressions for the crisis period
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly systemic risk of international insurers on key indicators
of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed
eﬀects and with clustered standard errors country level. The conceptual approach is the following:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time period Q1 2006 to Q4
2010. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by
two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data
sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.6409 0.0405 -0.0316 -0.0316 29.8448 -2.2579
(0.252) (0.920) (0.962) (0.377) (0.833) (0.851)
Total assets -0.0192 0.0042 -0.0001 -0.0072 3.9042 6.9138**
(0.269) (0.539) (0.994) (0.537) (0.214) (0.016)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0003*** 0.0005 0.0006*** 0.2112 -0.0841***
(0.480) (0.000) (0.254) (0.000) (0.180) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0146 -0.0049 0.0015 0.0061 -2.0916 1.1335
(0.226) (0.274) (0.774) (0.251) (0.547) (0.684)
Investment success -0.0281 -0.0585** -0.0127 -0.0016 -6.1390 -0.5964
(0.316) (0.020) (0.555) (0.722) (0.439) (0.581)
Loss ratio -0.0595 0.0016 0.0342 0.0004 -9.6110* -1.0701*
(0.432) (0.979) (0.298) (0.941) (0.062) (0.057)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -1.4385 -0.0573
(0.686) (0.732) (0.930) (0.754) (0.305) (0.471)
Non-policyholder liabilities -10.8000*** -1.7117 0.5478 -0.1793 -702.6164 13.0993
(0.001) (0.233) (0.764) (0.340) (0.370) (0.787)
Operating expenses 0.0157*** -0.0061 0.0031 0.0187 5.1510 -1.1348
(0.005) (0.476) (0.820) (0.316) (0.538) (0.796)
Other income 14.3000 1.8100 -15.8000 0.2190 -130.0000 60.0000**
(0.224) (0.429) (0.182) (0.970) (0.597) (0.021)
ROA -0.9207 -3.4268** 0.3275 0.5115 77.5754 67.3172
(0.776) (0.023) (0.549) (0.559) (0.628) (0.422)
Performance -0.0091** -0.0031 0.0088 0.0004 2.4556** 4.7450
(0.024) (0.294) (0.356) (0.947) (0.046) (0.180)
GDP growth 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.1959 0.3530
(0.770) (0.753) (0.243) (0.328) (0.373) (0.517)
Inflation 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0024 0.2310 -0.4832*
(0.656) (0.107) (0.801) (0.143) (0.320) (0.058)
Stock market turnover 0.0085 -0.0319* 0.0667** 0.0590** 4.2736 34.6236**
(0.679) (0.068) (0.018) (0.035) (0.654) (0.012)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 239 387 788 379 772
Adj. R2 0.787 0.847 0.575 0.470 0.244 0.155
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